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On Secure Bulletin Boards for E-Voting
Abstract: Vote collection together with storage of collected votes is the first
phase of practically any electronic voting (e-voting) protocol. This functionality is
provided by a bulletin board system. Many research papers in e-voting require the
existence of a secure bulletin board, but there are only a few concrete systems. In
the literature it is common to assume that bulletin board is a centralized trusted
party, but in recent works the importance of a distributed fault-tolerant bulletin
board has been raised.
In this thesis, we propose a formal model for analysis of security and function-
ality of a bulletin board system motivated by the security requirements Culnane
and Schneider introduced in Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2014.
We consider a secure bulletin board as a robust public transaction ledger presented
by Garay et al. in Eurocrypt 2015 that additionally provides receipts for successful
postings. More precisely, we introduce two properties: (Confirmable) Persistence
and Confirmable Liveness.
We study a bulletin board system proposed by Culnane and Schneider in our
model, and show that their protocol does not achieve Confirmable Liveness if
there exist corrupted item collection peers, but achieves Confirmable Persistence
for < N/3 corrupted item collection peers using only our trivial threshold signa-
ture scheme, otherwise the bound is < N/4. Motivated by the security analysis of
Culnane-Schneider bulletin board system, we propose a fully secure bulletin board
system and prove that it tolerates < N/3 corrupted item collection peers for Con-
firmable Persistence and < N/2 corrupted item collection peers for Confirmable
Liveness.
This thesis is based on a submitted paper ”A Cryptographic Approach to
Bulletin Boards” with co-authors Aggelos Kiayas, Helger Lipmaa, Janno Siim and
Thomas Zacharias.
Keywords: cryptography, e-voting, bulletin board, formal model
CERCS: P170 Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control
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E-valimiste jaoks mo˜eldud turvalistest teadetetahvli-
su¨steemidest
Lu¨hikokkuvo˜te: Peaaegu iga elektroonilise ha¨a¨letamise protokolli esimeseks eta-
piks on ha¨a¨lte kogumine ning nende talletamine. Seda teenust pakub teadetetahv-
lisu¨steem (bulletin board). Paljud teadusartiklid eeldavad turvalise teadetetahv-
lisu¨steemi olemasolu, kuid konkreetseid su¨steeme on va¨lja pakutud va¨he. Tihti
eeldatakse, et teadetetahvlisu¨steem on tsentraalne usaldatav osapool, kuid hilju-
tistes to¨o¨des on ta¨helepanu juhitud to˜rkekindla hajustalletuse olulisusele.
Ka¨esolevas to¨o¨s pakume va¨lja formaalse mudeli teadetetahvlisu¨steemi funkt-
sionaalsuse ning turvalisuse analu¨u¨simiseks. Meie mudeli aluseks on Culnane ja
Schneideri poolt konverentsil Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2014
va¨ljapakutud teadetetahvlisu¨steemi omadused. Me ka¨sitleme turvalist teadete-
tahvlisu¨steemi kui Garay ja teiste poolt konverentsil Eurocrypt 2015 tutvustatud
avalikku tehingute pearaamatut, mis o˜nnestunud ha¨a¨le talletamise korral va¨ljastab
kviitungi. Ta¨psemalt, me defineerime omadused (to˜endatav) pu¨sivus ning to˜endatav
elusus.
Me analu¨u¨sime Culnane ja Schneideri va¨ljapakutud teadetetahvlisu¨steemi tur-
valisust ning na¨itame, et nende protokolli korral ei ole elususe omadus ta¨idetud,
kui mo˜ni kogumisneel (item collection peer) on ebaaus. Nende su¨steem saavutab
to˜endatava pu¨sivuse kasutades triviaalset la¨visignatuuri juhul, kui ebaausaid kogu-
misneele on < N/3, vastasel korral on to˜ke < N/4. Culnane ja Schneideri teadete-
tahvlisu¨steemist motiveeritult pakume va¨lja uue su¨steemi, mille korral on tagatud
nii to˜endatav pu¨sivus kui ka to˜endatav elusus, kui ebaausaid kogumisneele on vas-
tavalt < N/3 ning < N/2. Lisaks on meie protokoll lihtne suhtluskeerukuselt.
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Electronic voting (e-voting) is one crucial aspect of electronic governance. E-voting
is expected to reduce the cost of elections and increase the voter turnout having
the overall goal to verify the entire election procedure. Two types of e-voting can
be identified: e-voting that uses voting machines located at polling stations and is
physically supervised by electoral authorities; e-voting via the Internet, also called
Internet voting (I-voting), where voting is done remotely using an electronic device
connected to the Internet.
In high-level description we may divide the server-side of e-voting into three
main stages. In the first stage, the task is to receive ballots and store them until
the end of the election period. In the second stage, we need to anonymise the
ballots and, finally, we must decrypt the encrypted ballots. These steps strongly
depend on the approach chosen, e.g., in case of code-voting [Cha01] the first and
the second steps cannot be distinguished (e.g., see [CZZ+16]).
The second phase can be implemented using mix-nets [Cha81]. Mix-net is a
set of mix servers that guarantee anonymity by mixing the input in a verifiable
way. Many implementations of mix-nets suitable for this scenario have been in-
troduced, e.g., [Nef01], [Fur05], [TW10], [LZ12], [FL16], [FLZ16], and it is stated
that to guarantee the anonymity of voters at least one of the mix servers must be
uncorrupted.
The first phase can be implemented using a bulletin board (BB) system. Namely,
it involves users who submit their ballots, vote (item) collection (IC) peers who
receive and store the ballots, and a web bulletin board (WBB) that publishes the
collected votes. The bulletin board should function as a ledger, i.e., once submitted
and published, nothing can be erased.
Many research papers in e-voting require the existence of a secure BB, but
there are only a few concrete systems (see [Pet05], [HL09] for early proposals). The
authors of [CGS97] claim that BB can be viewed as a secure broadcast channel
and, therefore, it can be implemented as a set of replicated servers implementing
a Byzantine Agreement protocol. Although the latter claim is widely spread, the
implementation of a BB is not straightforward. There are only a few approaches
introduced which, in fact, are not purely Byzantine Agreement protocols. It is also
common in the literature to assume that BB is a centralized trusted party, but in
recent works ([CS14b], [CZZ+16]) the importance of a distributed fault-tolerant
BB has been raised.
Results presented in this thesis are joint work with Aggelos Kiayas, Helger
Lipmaa, Janno Siim and Thomas Zacharias. Furthermore, our research paper is
submitted to a computer security conference.
The goal of this thesis (and our paper) is to study the security of BB systems
for e-voting. Motivated by the requirements presented by Culnane and Schneider
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in [CS14b], we introduce a formal framework consistent with the standards of dis-
tributed system research and cryptographic modelling to analyse the functionality
and security of BB systems. We build a connection between blockchain and BB
protocols, and formalize a secure BB system as a robust public transaction ledger
introduced in [GKL15] that additionally provides receipts for successful postings.
We define two properties named Persistence and Confirmable Liveness. The Per-
sistence property intuitively means that in order to be published on the WBB, a
threshold set of IC peers must approve the item, and once an item is published
it cannot be removed from the WBB. In high-level, the Liveness property means
that the protocol will successfully terminate and Confirmability captures the gen-
eration of receipts. Furthermore, we want Persistence to be Confirmable, i.e., the
behaviour of corrupted WBB can be detected using a verification algorithm.
We study the security of Culnane-Schneider (C-S) BB system introduced in
[CS14b] which uses a threshold signature scheme ([Des88], [Bol03]) to generate
receipts. We show that the protocol does not achieve liveness in case we have
corrupted IC peers, but it achieves Confirmable Persistence for threshold < N/3
of corrupted IC peers using the trivial threshold signature scheme (i.e., signature
is a set of ”normal” digital signatures). In case of non-trivial threshold signatures
with distributed key generation, the threshold of corrupted IC peers is roughly
< N/4.
Based on the analysis of C-S, we propose a fully secure BB system that achieves
Confirmable Persistence and Confirmable Liveness for < N/3 and < N/2 dishonest
IC peers, respectively. The enhanced protocol is very simple from the communi-
cation complexity aspect.
Contributions of the Author: In our paper, the author of this thesis researched
thoroughly available literature on BB systems, including various e-voting protocols.
The author compared available protocols and identified requirements for a secure
BB system that could be adaptable for different e-voting systems.
The author was involved in developing a formal framework for secure BB sys-
tems. Namely, the author introduced the notation of Confirmable Persistence, i.e.,
the importance of having security against corrupted WBB in Persistence. Further-
more, the author observed that we cannot achieve both, Liveness and Soundness,
thus, the Persistence considers only Stability and Unremovability.
The author also described the C-S BB system more formally and found the
described weaknesses. More precisely, the author constructed the attacks and
observed that the protocol does not achieve liveness in case of corrupted IC peers.
Also, the author proved Confirmable Persistence and observed that it is achieved
for < N/3 corrupted IC peers only using the trivial threshold signature scheme.
The author contributed to introducing a fully secure BB system. The author of
this thesis observed that re-broadcasting the item in the Publishing protocol means
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that we do not need to execute the Optimistic and Fallback protocols, it is sufficient
that IC peers (threshold)sign their local BB records and send these signatures
to the WBB. This made our BB system very simple from the communication
complexity aspect. Furthermore, the author showed that using the trivial threshold
signature scheme, the proposed BB system achieves Persistence and Confirmable
Persistence tolerating < N/3 corrupted IC peers. The author of this thesis also
observed that our fully secure BB system achieves Confirmable Liveness for < N/2
corrupted IC peers.
In comparison to the submitted paper, in this thesis we study C-S BB system
more thoroughly: we present its detailed description and its formal security proof
in our model. Furthermore, security proofs for our fully secure BB system are more
detailed, and in this thesis, we give a good overview of other BB systems introduced
in the literature. Furthermore, we also provide the reader with backround in
distributed systems and cryptography.
Thesis Outline: We begin in Section 2 with introducing the notation and def-
initions used in the rest of the thesis. In Section 3 we present a cryptographic
framework to analyse BB security. This is followed in Section 4 with describing
the C-S BB system [CS14b], its security analysis and a security proof for Con-
firmable Persistence. In Section 5 we propose an enhanced BB system inspired by
the C-S protocol and prove its security in our model. We conclude in Section 6
with an overview of related work on BB systems.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the notation and terminology used in the rest of this
thesis.
Consider a distributed system with global clock Clock ∈ N, each entity X has
its internal clock Clock[X] ∈ N.
Definition 2.1 ([HT94]). We say that a distributed system is synchronous if the
following conditions hold:
(i) For each step of a process there exist bounds for execution.
(ii) If an entity X sends a message to entity Y when Clock = T , then entity Y
receives it at some time Clock = T + δ (eventual message delivery).
(iii) For each entity X, it holds that |Clock[X]−Clock| ≤ ∆ (loose clock synchro-
nization).
Analogously, a distributed system is defined as asynchronous if there are no as-
sumptions on process execution speeds, message transmission delays and clock drift
rates.
A polynomial time Turing machine halts in polynomial time for any input. A
Turing machine M is Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) if it halts in polynomial
time for any input and additionally has a randomness tape.
In security definitions we consider security games between a challenger C and
an adversary A. We require that the advantage, i.e., the probability that any PPT
adversary A wins is negligible in the security parameter.
Definition 2.2. We say that a function ε is negligible, iff for any c ∈ N there
exists n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0, ε(n) < n−c holds.
Let κ be the security parameter and denote a negligible function by negl(·).
An adversary A is defined as static if it must select the set of players to corrupt
before the execution of the computation and adaptive if the adversary chooses who
to corrupt during the computation. We say that an adversary A is covert [AL10]
if it may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification in an attempt to cheat,
but does not want to get ”caught”. Furthermore, we consider an adversary A as
stateful if it maintains a state across queries. In the following of this thesis, we
consider PPT adversaries.
Bitcoin [Nak08] is a decentralized payment system based on a public trans-
action ledger in distributed manner. Anynomous players called miners execute
a protocol that maintains and extends the blockchain. Garay et al. introduced
in [GKL15] the notation of a public transaction ledger that captures the essence
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of Bitcoin’s operation as cryptocurrency. Namely, it guarantees two properties of
committed transactions: Persistence and Liveness. Persistence means that once
a transaction goes more than k blocks “deep” into the blockchain of one honest
player, then with overwhelming probability it will be included in blockchain of ev-
ery honest player. Furthermore, the ledger will assign that traction a permanent
position. In other words, all honest players will agree on all transactions and their
order.
Liveness property claims that all transactions originating from honest account
holders will eventually end up at a depth more than k blocks in blockchain of an
honest player, meaning that (honest) transactions will eventually be inserted into
the blockchain. In Section 3 we expand this notation for our formal framework for
secure BB systems.
In [Lam77] liveness property is informally defined as a requirement that some-
thing good will eventually happen. Therefore, we may say that a protocol achieves
liveness if it eventually terminates. In this work, we consider Confirmable Liveness
described in Section 3.2.
2.1 Hash Functions
Hash functions are functions that compress an input of arbitrary length to a result
with fixed length. If hash functions satisfy additional requirements, they are a
very powerful tool in the design of techniques to protect the authenticity of infor-
mation. A formal definition for a collision-resistant hash function family was given
in [Dam88].
Definition 2.3. We say that H : {0, 1}∗ × K → {0, 1}n is a collision-resistant
hash function family if for random k ←u K, it is hard to find x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}∗ such
that Hk(x0) = Hk(x1), i.e., for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible
function negl(·) such that for all κ ∈ N,
Pr [k ←u K, (x0, x1)← A(1κ, H, k) : Hk(x0) = Hk(x1)] ≤ negl(κ).
2.2 Signature Schemes
(Threshold) signature schemes can take a set of global parameters (e.g., the de-
scription of the underlying group) as an additional input. For simplicity, we omit
this in the following.
Definition 2.4. A digital signature scheme consists of three efficient algorithms,
denoted by Σ = (KGen, Sig,Vf).
KGen(1κ): A generation algorithm KGen generates a keypair (pk, sk) ← KGen(1κ)
for a secret signing key sk and a public verification key pk.
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Sigsk(m): A signing algorithm Sig inputs a message m and a secret signing key sk,
and returns a signature σ ← Sigsk(m) on the message m.
Vfpk(m,σ): A verification algorithm Vf takes a public verification key pk and a
message m with corresponding signature σ as input, and returns
b← Vfpk(m,σ) where b ∈ {0, 1}.
For each (pk, sk) ∈ KGen(1κ) and a valid message m, it holds that
Vfpk(m, Sigsk(m)) = 1.
We require the signature scheme to be existentially unforgeable against cho-
sen message attacks. The existential unforgeability against chosen message attack
(EUF-CMA, [GMR88]) security property is defined via the following game between
a challenger C and an adversary A.
Definition 2.5. We say that a signature scheme Σ is EUF-CMA-secure if
Advforge(A) = Pr
[GAΣ(1κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ),




if m∗has been queried from Sigsk(·) return⊥
return Vfpk(m
∗, σ∗).
Informally, in the Definition above, we give the adversary A access to the
signing oracle Sigsk(·), and say that it wins if it manages to forge a signature on
some message m∗, i.e., Vfpk(m∗, σ∗) = 1, without querying it from the signing
oracle.
2.3 Threshold Signature Schemes
Before we define threshold signature schemes (TSS), we informally introduce the
concept of threshold secret sharing [Sha79]. Secret sharing is a well-known cryp-
tographic method for protecting the secret s by distributing it amongst a set of N
parties.
Let t, N be two positive integers such that t < N . The set of values (s1, . . . , sN)
is said to be a (t, N)-threshold secret sharing of the value of s, if no t values from
this set reveal any information about s while there exists an efficient algorithm
that takes as an input t + 1 values from this set and outputs s. We denote it
(s1, . . . , sN)
(t,N)→ s.
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Definition 2.6 ([Des88]). Let ts < N be two positive integers. Assume the exis-
tence of a (ts, N)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
A (non-interactive) threshold signature scheme TSS consists of five efficient
algorithms, denoted by TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify,TssVf,Combine).
DistKeygen(1κ, ts, N): A randomized distributed interactive threshold key genera-
tion protocol that is run by the parties P1, . . . , PN . The public output is pk
and a tuple of public verification keys (pk1, . . . , pkN). The private output of
each Pi is a value sski such that (ssk1, . . . , sskN)
(ts,N)→ ssk, where ssk is the
secret key corresponding to pk.
ShareSigsski(m): A possibly randomized algorithm that takes as an input a private
key share sski and a message m outputting a signature share σi on the mes-
sage m.
ShareVerify(pk, pk1, . . . , pkN ,m, (i, σi)) : Outputs b ∈ {0, 1}, depending on whether
σi is a valid i-th signature share on m.
Combine(pk, pk1, . . . , pkN ,m, (i, σi)i∈S): Given that S ⊆ I is a subset of ts + 1
elements and σi is the ith signature share on m, outputs a full signature
σ = TSignssk(m) on m. (Or outputs ⊥, when some signature shares are
ill-formed.)
TssVfpk(m,σ): A deterministic algorithm that outputs b ∈ {0, 1}, depending on
whether σ is a valid signature on m.
For (ssk, pk, ssk1, . . . , sskN , pk1, . . . , pkN) output by DistKeygen(1
κ, ts, N), if S ⊆ I
such that |S| = ts + 1, σi = ShareSigsski(m), and σ = Combine(pk, pk1, . . . , pkN ,m,
(i, σi)i∈S), and a valid message m, it holds that
ShareVerify(pk, pk1, . . . , pkN ,m, (i, σi)) = 1, ∀ i ∈ S,
TssVfpk(m,σ) = 1.
The existential (ts, N)-unforgeability against chosen message attacks((ts, N)-
EUF-CMA) security property is defined via the following game between a chal-
lenger C and an adversary A.
Definition 2.7. We say that a threshold signature scheme TSS is (ts, N)- EUF-
CMA-secure against static corruption if
Advforge(A) = Pr
[GATSS(1κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ),
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for any stateful PPT adversary A where
GATSS(1κ)
C ⊂ {1, . . . , N} ← A
(ssk, pk, ssk1, . . . , sskN , pk1, . . . , pkN)← DistKeygen(1κ, ts, N)
(m∗, σ∗)← AShareSigsskj (·)(pk, {pkj}), j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
V = C ∪ S,S = {i : A made a signing query on (i,m∗)} ⊂ {1, . . . , N}
if |V| ≥ ts + 1 return⊥
return TSSVfpk(m
∗, σ∗).
Informally, in the Definition above, we let the adversary A choose the set
C of parties to corrupt and give it access to the signing oracle ShareSigsskj(·),
j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We say that A wins if it manages to forge a signature on some
message m∗, i.e., TssVfpk(m∗, σ∗) = 1, with seeing no more more than ts = |C ∪S|
signature shares where S is a set of parties i such that A made a signing query on
(i,m∗).
Proposed (ts, N)-EUF-CMA-secure threshold signature schemes having dis-
tributed key generation, e.g., [Bol03], [LJY14], require ts < N/2.
We note that some threshold signature schemes [Sho00, AMN01] consider the
case of (k, ts, N)-threshold signature schemes, where ts is the number of corrupted
parties the scheme can tolerate, and to actually honestly give a signature, the
participation of k ≥ ts + 1 parties is required. Such schemes allow one to have
k > N/2, but they are based on a trusted dealer. Having a trusted dealer should
be avoided in e-voting scenario.
In this work, we also use the following trivial (ts, N)-TSS, where ts < N can
be any integer: given an EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme Σ, each party Pi
has independently generated public and secret keys. The signature share of Pi
on m is equal to its signature on m. Signature shares of different Pi on m are
combined by concatenating them. The TSS verification on (σ1, . . . , σt) succeeds
only if each individual signature verification succeeds and t > ts. Clearly, this
trivial TSS is (ts, N)-EUF-CMA-secure. Observe that in case of trivial TSS we
do not have that ssk is secret shared as stated in Definition 2.7. We have that
ssk = {sski}, i ∈ S ⊆ {1, . . . , N} such that |S| ≥ ts + 1. However, we still consider
it as a trivial TSS.
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3 Security Framework for Bulletin Boards
In this section, we present a cryptographic framework for BB systems that was
introduced in our paper. We begin with describing the parties and the protocols
involved. This is followed by introducing our framework based on security require-
ments from [CS14b] and modelling approach presented in [CZZ+16] and [GKL15].
3.1 Entities and Protocols of a Bulletin Board System
A BB system consists of a number of parties:
• The setup authority denoted by SA is responsible for generating the setup
information and initializes all other parties with their private inputs.
• The users that submit items. In case of e-voting, items can be voters’ ballots,
elections result or audit information. Let n denote the number of users.
• The item collection (IC) peers denoted by P1, . . . ,PNc that interact with
users to post items and with the WBB to publish items.
• The web bulletin board (WBB) peers denoted by WBB1, . . . ,WBBNw are re-
sponsible for publishing posted items. In general, we consider the WBB as
a distributed sub-system, although in the literature, e.g., [CS14b], the WBB
sometimes contains only one publicly accessible peer.
During the setup SA specifies a posting policy denoted by
P = (Accept(·, ·), S(·)),
where Accept(·, ·) is a binary relation defined over pairs of user IDs and items, and
S(·) is a selection function over sets of items. More precisely, for user U to post an
item x, (U, x) ∈ Accept must hold. Function S is responsible for resolving conflicts
between clashing items. It takes as input a set XU of all items published by user U
and outputs a valid item x, e.g., in Estonian e-voting [HW14] if a voter U posted
m items XU = {x1, . . . , xm}, then only the last one must count. We may write
S(XU) = {xm}.
The setup authority initializes all entities with description of P . Next, all
parties engage in the setup interaction and, thus, every party has a private input,
e.g., signing key of a signature scheme over standard public key infrastructure, or
an authentication password, and some public parameters denoted by params.
We capture the functionality of BB using the following protocols:
• The Posting protocol is started by a user U to post item x using private input
sU. The user U and IC peers interact and successful posting of x results in
user U obtaining a receipt rec[x].
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• The Publishing protocol in which IC peers upload their local records of posted
items to the WBB.
There are two verification algorithms associated with the protocols: VerifyRec
takes (rec[x], x, sU, params) as input and is run by users to verify successful postings;
VerifyPub takes the published data and params as public input and is used to check
the WBB consistency.
Following [CZZ+16], we assume the existence of a global clock denoted by
Clock ∈ N and that each system entity X has an internal clock denoted by
Clock[X] ∈ N. We define the following events on the clocks:
• The event Init(X) : Clock[X] ← Clock, that initializes an entity X by syn-
chronizing its internal clock Clock[X] with the global clock Clock.
• The event Inc(Clock[X]) : Clock[X]← Clock[X] + 1, that causes the internal
clock of entity X to advance by one time unit.
Let E := {SA} ∪ {U`}`∈[n] ∪ {Pi}i∈[Nc] ∪ {WBBj}j∈[Nw] be the set of all entities
of a BB system. We denote by tc, tw the number of peers that the adversary may
statically corrupt and by Nc, Nw the total peers of the IC and WBB subsystem,
respectively. A corrupted peer may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol, or even go
offline again.We denote the local record of an IC peer Pi at internal time Clock[Pi] =
T as the set of items Lpost,i,T . The set of items published by WBB peer WBBj at
internal time Clock[WBBj] = T is denoted by Lpub,j,T .
3.2 Cryptographic Framework
The authors of [CS14b] claim that their BB must satisfy the following properties
which we refer to as Stability, Confirmability, Soundness and Unremovability :
• (bb.1) Only items that have been posted can appear on the WBB (Stability).
• (bb.2) Any item with a valid receipt must appear on the WBB (Confirma-
bility).
• (bb.3) No clashing items must both appear on the WBB (Soundness).
• (bb.4) Once published, no items can be removed from the WBB (Unremov-
ability).
The aforementioned properties are not formal enough to study cryptographic
security of the system. In the following, we formalise these properties. Namely,
study these properties under a formal framework inspired by the approach of dis-
tributed e-voting security of D-DEMOS [CZZ+16] with the notation of a robust
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public transaction ledger (RPTL) introduced in [GKL15]. The idea is to model a
secure BB as an RPTL that provides receipts for successful postings. The security
properties of an RPTL are captured using Persistence and θ-Liveness.
We introduce the concept of (Confirmable) Persistence. Persistence defined in
[GKL15] expresses the Unremovability property. In order to capture Stability, we
additionally require that an item x posted by user U cannot appear on the WBB
if it is was not added to local BB for at least Nc − 2tc honest IC peers during
the Posting protocol. We extend Persistence by considering the case that the
WBB sub-system can be also corrupted by a covert adversary. This is captured
by Confirmable Persistence where we require that any malicious behaviour of the
WBB is detected via the VerifyPub algorithm.
Confirmable θ-Liveness means that any honest user that submits an item x
will obtain a receipt within time θ and x will be published on the WBB. We
observe that Soundness and Confirmable Liveness cannot be satisfied concurrently
if honest users may post clashing items (attack in Section 4.2.1), e.g., in Estonian
e-voting [HW14] as a coercion countermeasure voters are allowed to vote multiple
times during the election period. This issue can be resolved via selection function
S. More precisely, we do not require the Soundness property to hold and allow
users to post clashing items, but we use verifiable S to remove all conflicting votes.
This allows us to achieve Confirmable Liveness.
In the threat model for Persistence, we assume asynchronous communication
allowing adversary to also drop messages between honest parties. The Persistence





lenger C and an adversary A. The game is described in Figure 1. Informally it
means that the adversary A wins there exists a published item x which is not in
local BB records for at least Nc − 2tc honest IC peers, or at some time T an item
x was published on the WBB, but at some T ′ > T it has been removed.
In Confirmable Persistence we allow the WBB to be malicious and deviate from









for a special case
where tw = Nw, except for the following:
• The inconsistent WBBj referred in either (P.1) or (P.2) may be any corrupted
WBB peer.
• For all j ∈ {1, . . . , Nw} and every moment T it must hold that VerifyPub
(Lpub,j,T , params) = accept.
Informally it means that verification algorithm VerifyPub must always accept.
Given the security games, Persistence and Confirmable Persistence are defined
as follows.
16
Threat model for Persistence.
(P.I). The adversary A statically corrupts up to tc, tw out-of the Nc, Nw total
peers of the IC and WBB sub-systems, respectively. Then, A provides the
challenger C with the set Lcorr ⊂ E of corrupted parties. Throughout the
game, C plays the role of honest entities that include SA.
(P.II). When an honest entity X wants to transmit a message M to an honest
entity Y , then it sends (X,M, Y ) to A, which may not forward M to Y .
(P.III). A may write on the incoming network tape of any honest entity.
(P.IV). A may invoke the event Inc(Clock[X]) arbitrarily.
Protocol execution under the presence of A.
• The challenger C initiates the setup phase playing the role of SA and de-
termines the posting policy P. It initializes every system entity X ∈ E by
running the event Init(X).
• Upon initialization, C and A engage in the setup phase, and the Posting and
Publishing protocols, where C acts on behalf of all honest entities.
• For each user U`, ` ∈ {1, . . . , n}, A may choose either of the two options:
(a). Corrupt, and thus fully control U`.
(b). Do not corrupt U`. In this case, A may initialize U` by running
Init(Clock[U`]) only once.
• The adversary A may provide C with a message (post,U`, x) for some honest
user U` and an item x of its choice. Upon receiving (post,U`, x), C engages in
the Posting protocol on behalf of U`. If the interaction is completed success-
fully, C obtains a receipt rec[x] for x.
Game winning conditions.
The game outputs 1 iff there is a WBB peer WBBj /∈ Lcorr such that at least one
of the following holds:
(P.1). There is an item x, tc + 1 IC peers {Pik}k∈[tc+1] and moments {Tik}k∈[tc+1]
s.t. for every T ′ ≥ min
k∈[tc+1]
{Tik}: (i) {Pi1 , . . . ,Pitc+1}∩Lcorr = ∅, (ii) for every
k ∈ [tc + 1] : x /∈ Lpost,ik,Tik and (iii) x ∈ Lpub,j,T ′ (Stability attack).
(P.2). There is an item x, and two moments T, T ′ s.t. (i) T ′ > T , (ii) x ∈ Lpub,j,T
and (iii) x /∈ Lpub,j,T ′(Unremovability attack).
Figure 1: The BB Persistence security game GA,tc,twPrst (1κ,E) between a challenger
C and an adversary A.
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Threat model for Confirmable Liveness.
(L.I). As (P.I) in Figure 1.
(L.II). When an honest entity X wants to transmit a message M to an honest
entity Y , then it just sends (X,M, Y ) to A. If the honest entity X sends
(X,M, Y ) to A, when the global time is Clock = T , then A must write
M on the incoming network tape of Y by the time that Clock = T + δ
(eventual message delivery).
(L.III). As (P.III) in Figure 1.
(L.IV). A may invoke the event Inc(Clock[X]) under the restriction that for any
entity X, |Clock[X]− Clock| ≤ ∆ (loose clock synchronization).
Protocol execution under the presence of A.
• The challenger initiates the Setup phase playing the role of SA and determines
the post access policy P = (Accept(·, ·), S(·)). Then, it initializes every system
entity X ∈ E by running the event Init(X).
• Upon initialization, A and C engage in the Setup phase, the Posting, and
Publishing protocols as in Figure 1.
Game winning conditions.
The game outputs 1 iff there is an honest user U and a moment T s.t. the following
conditions hold:
(L.1). A provided C with the message (post,U, x) at global time Clock = T .
(L.2). No honest IC peer engages in the Publishing protocol during global time
Clock ∈ [T, T + θ].
(L.3). Either of the following is true:
(a). By internal time Clock[U] ≤ T + θ, C did not obtain a value z s.t.
VerifyRec(z, x, crU, params) = accept, or
(b). There is a WBBj /∈ Lcorr s.t. for any moment Tj , there is a moment
T ′j ≥ Tj s.t. x /∈ Lpub,j,T ′j .
Figure 2: The Confirmable θ-Liveness security game GA,δ,∆,tc,twθ−C.Live (1κ,E) between a
challenger C and an adversary A.
Definition 3.1 ((Confirmable) Persistence). Let κ be the security parameter and
BB be a BB system with Nc IC peers and Nw WBB peers. We say that BB
achieves Persistence for fault tolerance thresholds (tc, tw), if for every PPT adver-
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sary A it holds that
Pr
[GA,tc,twPrst (1κ,E) = 1] ≤ negl(κ).
Furthermore, we say that BB achieves Confirmable Persistence for fault tolerance
threshold tc, if for every PPT adversary A it holds that
Pr
[GA,tcC.Prst(1κ,E) = 1] ≤ negl(κ).
In the threat model for Confirmable Liveness we consider synchronous com-
munication with eventual message delivery and bounded synchronization loss with
respect to the global clock, specified by upper bounds δ and ∆. Confirmable





challenger C and an adversary A in Figure 2.
Intuitively it means that the adversary A wins if an honest user does not obtain
a valid receipt within some θ, or an honestly posted item x is not published on the
WBB.
Definition 3.2 (Confirmable θ-Liveness). Let κ be the security parameter, θ, δ,∆ ∈
N and let BB be a BB system with with Nc BB peers and Nw WBB peers. We say
that BB achieves Confirmable θ-Liveness for fault tolerance thresholds (tc, tw), de-
lay message bound δ and synchronization loss bound ∆, if for any PPT adversary
A, it holds that
Pr
[GA,δ,∆,tc,twθ−C.Live (1κ,E) = 1] ≤ negl(κ).
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4 Bulletin Board of Culnane-Schneider
In this section, we describe the BB of vVote voting system ([CRST15, BCS16])
introduced by Culnane and Schneider in [CS14b]. In the following, we refer to it
also as C-S BB system. The vVote voting system was used in the state election
in the Australian state of Victoria in November 2014. We study the security of
C-S BB as it has already been used in real-world elections and the vVote system
itself has been published in IEEE Security and Privacy 2016 which is one of the
best journals in the field. In Section 6 we describe other BB systems introduced
in the literature. We have included related work in the end of this thesis, so that
the concept would be more understandable and weaknesses clearer to the reader.
We begin with detailed overview of the C-S BB system followed by its security
analysis.
4.1 Description of the System
The C-S BB uses a signature scheme Σ = (KGen, Sig,Vf) and a (ts, Nc)-threshold
signature scheme TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify,TssVf,Combine). De-
note by ski the individual signature key of peer Pi. Let ssk be the threshold
signature key, and let sski be its ith share. Denote by Clash some predefined clash
relation and by H some hash function.
The C-S BB system considers users, IC peers denoted by Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , Nc},
and a single WBB. We note that in [CS14b] IC peers are called local BB peers, for
clarity to minimise confusion between BB peers and the WBB, we refer to IC peers
and the WBB. Clearly, the system is initialized by SA but Culnane and Schneider
do not address this in their paper. The C-S BB system runs in periods and consists
of the Posting protocol and the Publishing protocol. The Publishing protocol
consists of two protocols, the Optimistic protocol and the Fallback protocol. Each
period p is a time interval between Tbegin,p and Tend,p, i.e., p := [Tbegin,p, Tend,p]. For
each period p an IC peer Pi has a local record Bi,p of received items x and a local
database Di,p of signatures on items x from other IC peers. In the beginning of
each period p, each peer Pi has Bi,p, Di,p ← ∅, i.e., both databases are initialized
empty.
While the following protocols directly follow C-S BB, we include more details
so it would be possible to analyse their security. C-S do not describe any Accept
nor Clash relations. For clarity, we have added the credential crU for each user
U and require that for user U to post an item x it holds that Accept(U, x) = 1.
Furthermore, C-S simply claim that each Pi checks that there is no clash between
x and previous posts, in the following we require that Clash(x, x′) = 0 for all
previously posted x′. The following protocols use hash function H, but we note
that hash functions were used in the full version [CS14a], but not in the conference
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version of C-S BB [CS14b].
Assume that we have a period p. The protocol for user U to post an item x is
as follows.
Posting Protocol:
U→ Pi: User U broadcasts item x with credential crU to all peers Pi, i ∈ [Nc].
Pi → Pj: Upon receiving x from U , each Pi checks that (i) crU is valid for U (i.e
Accept(U, x) = 1) and (ii) x does not clash with any previously posted item
x′ during p or previous periods (i.e., Clash(x, x′) = 0). If both checks are
successful, then it broadcasts (i,m = (p, x, crU), Sigski(m)) to all other IC
peers.
Pi: Pi waits for messages (j,m = (p, x, crU), Sigskj(m)) from peers Pj, j 6= i, and
appends them to the dataset of received signed items Di,p.
– Upon receiving Nc − tc valid signatures on (p, x, crU) (including its own),
Pi adds (p, x) to its local BB record Bi,p for period p.
Pi → U: Upon adding (p, x) to Bi,p, Pi sends its TSS share (i,m = (p, x),
ShareSigsski(m)) to U.
U : The user U waits for signatures (j,m = (p, x), ShareSigsskj(m)) from Nc − tc ≥
ts + 1 peers Pj, j 6= i. When this happens, let SU be a set of Nc − tc peers
from which U can combine the share. U obtains the receipt for x,
aaarec[x] := TSignssk((p, x))← Combine(pk, pk1, . . . , pkNc , (p, x), (j, σj)j∈SU) .
Local BB records are published at the end of each period p. The Fallback
protocol is executed only if the threshold of peers (Nc − tc) do not agree on local
BB records in the end of the Optimistic protocol. If all peers are honest, the
Fallback protocol is never executed.
Optimistic Protocol:
Pi → Pj: Each Pi broadcasts
(
i,m = (p,H(Bi,p)), Sigski(m))
)
to all other IC peers.
– Each Pi waits until it receives Nc− tc valid signatures
(
j,m = (p,H(Bj,p)),
ρj := Sigskj ,(m)
)
from different IC peers (including its own).
– If ]
{
j ∈ I : H(Bj,p) = H(Bi,p) ∧ Vfpkj(ρj) = 1
}
< Nc − tc, then Pi broad-
casts a message (i,m = (p,Di,p), Sigski(m)) to all IC peers, indicating that it
engages in the Fallback protocol (see below).
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Pi → WBB: Each Pi sends (i,m = (p,Bi,p), ShareSigsski(m)) to WBB.
– WBB waits for messages (j,m = (p,Bj,p), σj = ShareSigsskj(m)) from at
least Nc − tc ≥ ts + 1 peers Pj.
– Otherwise, let S be a set of those ≥ Nc − tc peers that agree on the
contents of the BB and let Bp be the board of agreed-on contents. Obtain
TSignssk((p,Bp))← Combine(pk, pk1, . . . , pkNc , (p,Bp), (j, σj)j∈S).
– Publish WBBreceipt[p,Bp] := (m = (p,Bp),TSignssk(m)).
Fallback Protocol:
Pi → Pj: Each Pi broadcasts (i,m = (p,Di,p), Sigski,(m)) to all other IC peers.
– Each Pj, j 6= i, updates its database with the new data, i.e., with the
signatures it is missing, and then updates its board. More precisely, if
Vfpki
(
m = (p,Di,p), Sigski,(m))
)
= 1, then Pj will put all new signatures
in Di,p to its database Dj,p (i.e. Pj sets Dj,p ← Dj,p ∪Di,p). For any x: if Pj
has Nc − tc valid signatures on (p, x, crU) then he adds (p, x) to Bj,p.
– Pj broadcasts a message
(
j,m = (p,H(Bj,p)), Sigskj(m)
)
indicating that it
re-engages in Step 1 of the Optimistic protocol (see above) for the updated
record Bj,p.
4.2 Security Analysis
The authors of [CS14b] use the Event-B modelling approach [Abr10] to prove the
correctness and security of the system. The idea is that the system is described
in terms of states it can have and events that transform the state. Event-B uses
set theory as a modelling notation and refinement to represent systems at differ-
ent abstraction levels. Refinement intuitively means that one system implements
another. The goal is to verify consistency between different refinement levels.
The security of C-S is proved in a weaker model that has a number of restric-
tions on the adversarial power. In the following, we study the security of the C-S
BB system in the threat model introduced in Section 3.2.
4.2.1 Attacking Confirmable Persistence
Observe that in the Posting protocol users are not allowed to post clashing data.
This allows the Soundness property (bb.3) to hold. Persistence property holds as
in case of honest WBB, it will never accept inconsistently posted items nor remove
any published items.
Confirmable Persistence property considers security against corrupted WBB.
All data published must be accompanied with a valid receipt (WBBreceipt), thus
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an attack against Stability and Unremovability will be an attack against (ts, Nc)-
TSS and Σ. To be precise, the C-S BB assumes (k, ts, Nc) - TSS where ts = tc and
k = Nc − ts > ts + 1, and claim that their protocol can tolerate < Nc/3 corrupted
IC peers. However, they do not refer the reader to any specific constructions of
TSSs. Schemes with such properties do exist (e.g., [Sho00, AMN01]), but they are
based on a trusted dealer. Having a trusted third party should be avoided in our
scenario.
TSSs based on distributed interactive key generation protocol have been in-
troduced (e.g., [Bol03]), but they are based on the assumptions that k = ts + 1
and ts < Nc/2, the latter is due to the key generation phase. Therefore, we take
ts < Nc/2.
Consider the following attack against Confirmable Persistence and especially
Unremovability (property (bb.4)). Assume that we have (ts = dNc/2e − 1, Nc)-
EUFCMA-secure TSS and tc = dNc/3e − 1 < Nc/3. We show that a corrupted
WBB can output two valid WBBreceipts for a period p, i.e.,
w = WBBreceipt[p,Bp] = (m = (p,Bp), σ = TSignssk(m)),
w′ = WBBreceipt[p,B′p] = (m
′ = (p,B′p), σ
′ = TSignssk(m
′)),
w 6= w′ : TssVfpk(m,σ) = TssVfpk(m′, σ′) = 1.
Let th := ts−tc. In period p user U posts an item x, but does not obtain a receipt
rec[x], because the adversary blocked the communication such that (x, p) ∈ Bi,p
for only one honest peer Pi. In the end of period p, the Optimistic protocol is
executed, and the adversary blocks communication such that exactly (ts+1)−tc =
th+1 = dNc/2e−dNc/3e+1 honest peers and corrupted peers threshold sign a Bp
such that (x, p) 6∈ Bp and send it to the WBB. More precisely, the WBB receives
(th + 1) + tc = ts + 1 signature shares on (p,Bp) such that x 6∈ Bp, and can output
a valid receipt w. Remaining honest peers execute the Fallback followed by the
Optimistic protocol, and agree on B′p such that (x, p) ∈ B′p. After that, the WBB
can output a valid receipt w′ such that x ∈ B′p.
Therefore, a corrupted WBB can output two valid w and w′ for one period p,
and the Unremovability property is violated. In the next section, we show that
the C-S BB system tolerates tc < Nc/4 corrupted IC peers to achieve Confirmable
Persistence when not using the trivial TSS defined in Section 2.3.
4.2.2 Attacking Confirmable Liveness
Before describing an attack against Confirmable Liveness, we present the liveness
assumptions of C-S BB system. One of the following three conditions should hold.
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• All IC peers are honest and online. No adversary is considered for IC peers.
• The number of corrupted peers < Nc/3 and all users are honest. Under this
assumption, all users must always broadcast their postings. As a result all
IC peers will be aware of this. We will show that this is crucial to achieve
liveness as a corrupted user may engage in the Posting protocol such that
liveness is affected.
• The number of corrupted peers < Nc/3, but they do not change their database
once it is fixed and will not send different databases to different peers, but
users can be corrupted. In this case adversary A is considered to be covert.
This assumption implies that adversary can still cause stopping failures (due
to protocol re-runs after malicious detection) which is an attack against
liveness.
Culnane and Schneider allow peers to go arbitrarily offline and online as long
as always a threshold set of honest peers is online. If that is the case, the adversary
can make peers go online and offline so that no messages are never delivered and
liveness cannot be achieved. Thus, we do not consider this as an option.
In general, these liveness assumptions are not preserved under a standard se-
curity framework. Next, we show that without aforementioned assumptions, the
liveness of C-S BB system can be broken.
Consider the following attack. In period p an honest user Uh broadcasts xh
to all peers Pi, i ∈ [Nc], and obtains a valid receipt rec[xh]. Next, a corrupted
user Uc deviates from broadcasting and sends xc to all tc corrupted IC peers and
exactly N − 2tc honest IC peers. Denote the latter set of honest peers by H[xc].
Observe, that even if tc honest peers are not even aware of x, the collaboration of
tc + (Nc − 2tc) = Nc − tc is enough so that Uc obtains a valid receipt rec[xc], yet
xc ∈ Bi,p only for honest peers Pi ∈ H[xc]. Denote by S[xc] the tc honest peers s.t.
xc 6∈ Bi,p.
Next, the Optimistic protocol is executed and corrupted peers send their signed
local BB records only to honest peers from set H[xc]. After that step, all corrupted
peers remain inert. Therefore, honest peers from set S[xc] want to execute the
Fallback protocol, but honest peers from set H[xc] send their signed databases to
the WBB. As a result, the WBB does not receive Nc − tc signature shares on Bp
and cannot publish anything for period p. Hence, liveness cannot be achieved.
The weakness in the design of C-S exploited by the above attack is that users
are the only ones responsible for providing the posted items to the IC peers. Thus,
liveness cannot be achieved in case there exist corrupted IC peers. In the following,
we propose re-broadcasting of posted items to guarantee that if at least one honest
peers receives an item, then eventually all honest peers will do so.
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4.3 Confirmable Persistence of Culnane-Schneider Bulletin
Board System
The authors of [CS14b] use Event-B modelling and refinement approach to prove
the correctness and security of their BB system, but its actual cryptographic se-
curity is unknown.
In this section, we prove Confirmable Persistence for C-S BB system. Recall
that since it has only one WBB peer, we denote WBB := WBB1 and the view of
the WBB as Lpub,T := Lpub,1,T . Let Prec[p] be the set of periods preceding p. The
total view of the WBB at some T during period p, is the union of the agreed and
published BB records for all periods in Prec[p].
For clarity, in the following proofs for C-S BB system, we do not consider hash
functions, we assume that H is collision-resistant.
The verification algorithms VerifyRec and VerifyPub are defined as
VerifyRec(rec[x], x, crU, params) := TssVfpk(m = (p, x),TSignssk(m)),
VerifyPub(Lpub,T , params) :=
∧








We begin with a useful Lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Assume that TSS is (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-secure. Assume that th ≥ tc,
where th := ts − tc. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary. If GA,P,tcC.Prst (1κ,E) = 1
for the C-S BB system (and the BB system from Section 5), then for any period p
with 1− negl(κ) probability there exist a set H := {Pik}k∈[th+1] of honest IC peers
that output ShareSigsskik
((p,Bp)) for k ∈ [th + 1].









) ∈ Lpub,T such that TssVfpk(m,σ) = 1.
As a contradiction, assume that less than th+1 honest peers output a threshold
signature on (p,Bp). We construct the following adversary ATSS that breaks the
static (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA security of TSS.
ATSS invokes A and emulates the game GA,P,tcC.Prst (1κ,E) playing the role of the
challenger C, as follows: the adversary A responds with the set of corrupted peers
Lcorr, so ATSS in turn sends the set of corrupted IC peers IC ⊆ Lcorr to the (ts, Nc)-
EUF-CMA challenger and hence corrupts the same subset of peers (players). Each
time A makes a signature share query for some Pi 6∈ IC, ATSS makes the same
query to the signing oracle who returns the correct signature share, and forwards
the signature share to A.
Since TssVfpk((p,Bp), σ) = 1, and A queried less than th + 1 honest peers then
A forged the threshold signature σ. If that is the case, ATSS outputs ((p,Bp), σ) as
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a successful forgery. Thus, if A wins GA,P,tcC.Prst (1κ,E) with non-negligible probability,
then ATSS outputs a successful forgery with non-negligible probability which con-
tradicts to the (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-security of TSS. Therefore, with 1 − negl(κ)
probability, some set H of th + 1 honest peers threshold signed (p,Bp).
Next, we are ready to give a proof for Confirmable Persistence.
Theorem 4.2. Let Nc, tc, ts ∈ N. Let Σ be an EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme
and TSS be a (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-secure TSS. If tc < (ts + 1)/2, then the C-S BB
system with Nc IC peers over TSS achieves tc-Confirmable Persistence.
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary against the Confirmable Persistence
game GA,P,tcC.Prst (1κ,E). In the following th := ts− tc. We show that with 1−negl(κ)
probability neither of the properties (P.1) nor (P.2) from Figure 1 can hold and
VeryfyPub accepts. Consider the following cases.




= accept, then (P.1) can not
hold. Suppose there exists an item (x, p), honest peers H′ = {Pik}k∈[tc+1] such that
H′ ∩ Lcorr = ∅, and moments {Tik}k∈[tc+1] with the following properties. For every
moment T ′ ≥ min
k∈[tc+1]
{Tik}:
(i) (x, p) ∈ Lpub,T ′ ;












= accept and TSS is (ts, Nc)-
unforgeable, it follows from Lemma 4.1 that with 1− negl(κ) probability at least
th + 1 honest peers signed Bp such that (x, p) ∈ Bp no later than moment T ′.
An honest peer threshold signs Bp if it has obtained Nc − tc signatures on
(p,Bp). Suppose now that less than Nc − 2tc of the signatures are from honest
peers. We show that in that case we can construct an adversary AΣ that breaks
the unforgeability of Σ.
AΣ invokes A and plays C in the Confirmable Persistence game. AΣ runs A
that returns Lcorr, the set of corrupted peers. Challenger for the EUF-CMA game
sends pk to AΣ. Adversary AΣ assigns key pk to a random peer Pi 6∈ Lcorr, and
for the rest of the system, runs setup as usual. AΣ interacts with A and collects
signatures on (p,Bp) to a set S. With certain probability Pi’s signature is in S
and Pi is the honest peer that did not sign (p,Bp). Adversary AΣ returns Pi’s
signature as a forgery.
Therefore, at least Nc − 2tc of the signatures are from honest peers Pi and for
these honest peers (x, p) ∈ Bi,p. Since (Nc− 2tc) + (tc + 1) = Nc− tc + 1 > Nc− tc,
we have a contradiction.
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= accept, then (P.2) can
not hold. First, let us show that for a single period p with 1−negl(κ) probability
A can output a valid threshold signature for exactly one database Bp.
Assume to the contrary that A outputs
w = WBBreceipt[p,Bp] = (m = (p,Bp), σ = TSignssk(m)),
w′ = WBBreceipt[p,B′p] = (m
′ = (p,B′p), σ
′ = TSignssk(m
′)),
w 6= w′ : Vfpk(m,σ) = Vfpk(m′, σ′) = 1.
It follows from Lemma 4.1, that with probability 1 − negl(κ) some set H of
th + 1 honest peers threshold signed (p,Bp) and some set H′ of th + 1 honest
peers threshold signed (p,B′p). According to the protocol description, H∩H′ = ∅.
An honest IC peer threshold signs Bp if it has obtained Nc − tc signatures on
(p,Bp). Suppose now that less than Nc−2tc of the signatures are from honest peers.
In that case we can construct an adversary AΣ that breaks EUF-CMA-security of
Σ, the construction of AΣ is the same as above.
Therefore, at least Nc − 2tc of the signatures are from honest peers. Denote
them by set S. Since |S|+ |H′| ≥ Nc − 2tc + th + 1 > Nc − tc at least one honest
peer Pi threshold signs B
′
p and also sends signature on Bp. If Pi threshold signs
B′p, then the protocol is over for it and it would not sign B
′
p. Then it must first
sign Bp and then threshold sign the database B
′
p. Therefore Bp ⊆ B′p.
Arguing similarly we get that there must me be some honest peer Pj that first
signed B′p and later threshold signed Bp. Then also B
′
p ⊆ Bp. Hence, Bp = B′p,
which contradicts our assumption.










= accept such that (x, pˆ) ∈ Lpub,T and (x, pˆ) 6∈ Lpub,T ′ . As
(x, pˆ) ∈ Lpub,T , it follows that there exists pˆ ∈ Prec[p] such that (x, pˆ) ∈ Bpˆ. On
the contrary, as (x, pˆ) 6∈ Lpub,T ′ , we have that (x, pˆ) 6∈ B′pˆ. Since for every period p
adversary can output valid signature for one database, we have a contradiction.
The above implies that if we have ts < Nc/2, the C-S BB system tolerates
roughly < Nc/4 corrupted IC peers, Culnane and Schneider claim that their system
can tolerate < Nc/3 corrupted IC peers. We note that when using the trivial
threshold signature defined in Section 2, the protocol tolerates roughly < Nc/3
corrupted IC peers.
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5 A Fully Secure Bulletin Board System
In this section, we present an enhanced BB system based on the C-S BB system
which is fully secure in our framework proposed in Section 3. More precisely,
our fully secure BB system achieves (Confirmable) Persistence and Confirmable
Liveness for < Nc/3 and < Nc/2 corrupted IC peers, respectively. Furthermore,
the enhanced system is simple from the communication complexity aspect. This
system is also introduced in our paper.
5.1 Description of the System
As in Section 4.1, we use a signature scheme Σ = (KGen, Sig,Vf) and a (ts, Nc)-
threshold signature scheme TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify,TssVf,
Combine). Denote by ski the individual signature key of peer Pi. Let ssk be the
threshold signature key, and let sski be its ith share.
As the C-S BB system, the enhanced system contains users, IC peers denoted
by Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , Nc}, and a single WBB. The new system also contains SA that
initializes the entities. The protocol runs in periods and consists of the Posting
protocol and the Publishing protocol. Each period p is a time interval between
Tbegin,p and Tend,p, i.e., p := [Tbegin,p, Tend,p]. For each period p an IC peer Pi
has a local record Bi,p of received items x and a local database Di,p of received
peers’ signatures of items x. In the beginning of each period p, each peer Pi has
Bi,p, Di,p ← ∅, i.e., databases are initialized empty.
We enhance the C-S protocol by re-broadcasting x. Namely, an IC peer Pi
will re-broadcast item x, if it has not received it from a user U but received
(j,m = (p, x, crU), Sigskj(m)) from another IC peer Pj. This prevents the attack
described in Section 4.2.2. Furthermore, the new Publishing protocol does not
include Optimistic and Fallback protocols. In the new Publishing protocol, in the
end of each period each IC peer (threshold)signs its local BB record and sends it
to the WBB.
Assume that we have a period p. The protocol for user U to post item x is as
follows.
Posting Protocol:
U→ Pi: User U broadcasts item an x with credential crU to all peers Pi, i ∈ [Nc].
Pi → Pj: Upon receiving x from U, each Pi checks that crU is valid for U, i.e
Accept(U, x) = 1. If the check is successful, then it broadcasts (i,m =
(p, x, crU), Sigski(m)) to all other IC peers.
Pi: Pi waits for messages (j,m = (p, x, crU), Sigskj(m)) from peers Pj, j 6= i, and
adds them to the dataset of received signed items Di,p.
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– Upon receiving a message (j,m = (p, x, crU), Sigskj(m)), if Pi has not
received (x, crU) from some user and has not previously broadcast (i,m,
Sigski(m)), and Accept(U, x) = 1, then it broadcasts (i,m, Sigski(m)) to all
other IC peers.
– Upon receiving Nc − tc − 1 valid signatures on (p, x, crU), Pi adds (p, x) to
local BB record Bi,p for period p.
Pi → U: Upon adding (p, x) to Bi,p, Pi sends (i,m = (p, x), ShareSigsski(m)) to U.
U: The user U waits for valid TSS share signatures (j,m = (p, x), ShareSigsskj(m))
from Nc − tc ≥ ts + 1 peers Pj, j 6= i. When this happens, let SU be a set
of Nc − tc IC peers from which U can combine the share. U sets obtains the
receipt for x
aaarec[x] := TSignssk((p, x))← Combine(pk, pk1, . . . , pkNc , (p, x), (j, σj)j∈SU) .
In the end of each period p, local BB records are published. The publishing
protocol of our fully secure BB system is presented below.
Publishing Protocol:
Pi → WBB: Each Pi sends (i,m = (p,Bi,p), ShareSigsski(m)) to the WBB.
– WBB waits for messages (j,m = (p,Bj,p), σj = ShareSigsskj(m)) from at
least ts + 1 peers j.
– Let S be a set of those ≥ Nc − tc peers that agree on the contents of the
BB and let Bp be the board of agreed-on contents. Obtain
aaaaaaaaTSignssk((p,Bp))← Combine(pk, pk1, . . . , pkNc , (p,Bp), (j, σj)j∈S) .
– Publish WBBreceipt[p,Bp] := (m = (p,Bp),TSignssk(m)).
5.2 Confirmable Persistence
We use the same notation as in Section 4.3, recall that VerifyRec and VerifyPub are
defined as
VerifyRec(rec[x], x, crU , params) := TssVfpk(m = (p, x),TSignssk(m)),
VerifyPub(Lpub,T , params) :=
∧







, and Prec[p] is the set of periods
preceding p. In other words, the total view of the WBB at some T during period p,
is the union of the agreed and published BB records for all periods in Prec[p]. Next
theorems follow the notation from formal definition of (Confirmable) Persistence
(see Definition 3.1).
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Theorem 5.1 (Confirmable Persistence). Let Nc, tc, ts ∈ N and set ts = Nc−tc−1.
Let TSS be a (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-secure TSS (e.g., the trivial TSS). If tc < Nc/3,
then the fully secure BB system with Nc IC peers over TSS achieves Confirmable
Persistence for tolerance threshold tc.
Proof. LetA be an arbitrary PPT adversary against Confirmable Persistence game
GA,P,tcC.Prst (1κ,E). We set th := ts − tc. If tc < Nc/3, then th > tc − 1. We show that
with 1− negl(κ) probability neither of the properties (P.1) nor (P.2) from Figure
1 can hold and VerifyPub accepts. This implies that A cannot win and completes
the proof.
There is a moment T ′ s.t. if VerifyPub
(
Lpub,T ′ , params
)
= accept, then (P.1) can
not hold: Suppose there exists an item (x, p), honest peers H′ = {Pik}k∈[tc+1] such
that H′ ∩ Lcorr = ∅, and moments {Tik}k∈[tc+1] with the following properties. For
every moment T ′ ≥ min{Tik : k ∈ [tc + 1]}:
(i) (x, p) ∈ Lpub,T ′ ;










= accept and TSS is
(ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-secure, it follows from Lemma 4.1 that at least th + 1 honest
peers signed Bp such that (x, p) ∈ Bp no later than moment T ′. Since th =
Nc − 2tc − 1, we have that (th + 1) + (tc + 1) > Nc − tc, so there exists an honest
peer that threshold signed two databases in period p (one with (x, p) and one
without (x, p)). This contradicts the Publishing protocol description.
There is a moment T ′ s.t. if VerifyPub
(
Lpub,T ′ , params
)
= accept, then(P.2) can
not hold: First, let us show that for a single period p with 1−negl(κ) probability
A can output a valid threshold signature for exactly one database.
Assume to the contrary that A outputs
w = WBBreceipt[p,Bp] = (m = (p,Bp), σ = TSignssk(m)),
w′ = WBBreceipt[p,B′p] = (m
′ = (p,B′p), σ
′ = TSignssk(m
′)),
w 6= w′ : Vfpk(m,σ) = Vfpk(m′, σ′) = 1.
It follows from Lemma 4.1, that with 1 − negl(κ) probability, some set H of
th + 1 honest peers threshold signed (p,Bp) and some set H′ of th + 1 honest
peers threshold signed (p,B′p). According to the Publishing protocol description,
we have that H ∩ H′ = ∅. Since tc < Nc/3, we have that (th + 1) + (th + 1) =
2(ts − tc + 1) = 2(Nc − tc − 1 − tc + 1) = 2(Nc − 2tc) > Nc − tc, so at least one
honest IC peer threshold signed both Bp and B
′
p. This leads to a contradiction
as according to the Publishing protocol an honest peer threshold signs only one
database in period p.
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= accept such that (x, pˆ) ∈ Lpub,T and (x, pˆ) 6∈ Lpub,T ′ . As
(x, pˆ) ∈ Lpub,T , it follows that there exists pˆ ∈ Prec[p] such that (x, pˆ) ∈ Bpˆ. On
the contrary, as (x, pˆ) 6∈ Lpub,T ′ , we have that (x, pˆ) 6∈ B′pˆ. Since for every period
p adversary can output valid signature for one database, we have a contradiction.
Observe that in the fully secure BB system, an honest WBB adds Bp to Lpub,T
only if it can combine a valid signature TSignssk((p,Bp)). Thus, the following
Theorem follows trivially.
Theorem 5.2 (Persistence). Let Nc, tc, ts ∈ N and set ts = Nc − tc − 1. Let
TSS be a (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-secure TSS (e.g., the trivial TSS). If tc < Nc/3, then
the fully secure BB system with Nc IC peers over TSS achieves Persistence for
tolerance thresholds (tc, 0).
Our fully secure BB system requires ts = Nc − tc − 1, i.e., we must use the
trivial TSS defined in Section 2.3. This is indeed equal to claiming that instead
of TSS, we use EUF-CMA-secure Σ, and require that a user/the WBB waits for
Nc− tc valid signatures. We use the language of TSS for consistency with the C-S
BB system.
We recall that in case of our trivial TSS the signature is a concatenation of
individual signatures. Thus, a valid threshold signature is longer than for classical
TSS. As Nc is rather small for BB systems, this is not an issue.
5.3 Confirmable Liveness
In this section, we give a proof for Confirmable Liveness (see Definition 3.2) of
the new fully secure BB system. Recall that Confirmable Liveness is not achieved
by the original C-S BB system described in Section 4. In the following proof,
we show that for every p = [Tbegin,p, Tend,p], an honest user that posts an item x
during p at least some specified time prior to Tend,p will obtain a receipt for x
and x will be published on the WBB. Taking account the delay message bound δ
and synchronization loss bound ∆, we consider that each (honest) peer Pi stops
broadcasting messages in the Posting protocol at local time Clock[Pi] = Tend,p + ∆
and stops receiving messages and engages in the Publishing protocol for period p
at local time Clock[Pi] = Tend,p + ∆ + δ.
Theorem 5.3 (Confirmable θ-Liveness). Let θ, δ,∆, Nc, tc, ts ∈ N. Let Σ be an
EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme and TSS be a (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-secure TSS.
Let Tcomp ∈ N be the time complexity upper bound of the processes in the fully
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secure protocol. If tc < ts + 1 ≤ Nc − tc, then the BB system described with
Nc IC peers over Σ and TSS achieves θ-Confirmable Liveness for fault tolerance
thresholds (tc, 0), delay message bound δ and synchronization loss bound ∆, and
for every θ ≥ ∆ + 3δ + (2Nc + 3)Tcomp.
Proof. For θ ≥ ∆ + 3δ + (2Nc + 3)Tcomp, consider an adversary A against the
θ-Confirmable Liveness game GA,δ,∆,tc,0θ−C.Live (1κ,E) that wins. Assume that conditions
(L.1) and (L.2) of GA,δ,∆,tc,0θ−C.Live (1κ,E) hold. Namely,
(L.1) for some honest user U, A provides C with the message (post,U, x) at global
time Clock = T , where T is during a period p = [Tbegin,p, Tend,p].
(L.2) no Publishing protocol execution happens during global time interval
[T, T + θ].
In the BB system, the Publishing protocol starts at global time Clock = Tend,p,
which suggests that U engaged at the Posting protocol at global time Clock = T ≤
Tend,p − θ.
We will show that condition (L.3) can not hold, which implies that A can not
win the game and completes the proof. We analyse the following cases.
(L.3.a) can not hold: By global time Clock ≤ T + θ, U will obtain a valid receipt
rec[x] for x with 1− negl(κ) probability. Based on the description of the Posting
protocol in Section 5.1, we show that the waiting time for U is upper bounded by
the value θ∗ := ∆ + 3δ + (2Nc + 3)Tcomp. In our computation, we always consider
time advancement according to the description of the the Posting protocol and
under the restrictions posed in the Confirmable Liveness game, i.e., message delay
bound δ and synchronization bound ∆. We assume that if global clock Clock ≤ T ′,
then for all entities X Clock[X] ≤ T ′ + ∆, and A cannot change the global clock
Clock.
By (L.1), when U broadcasts (x, crU), the global time is Clock = T . Hence,
taking into account the clock synchronization bound ∆, each peer Pi has then
internal time Clock[Pi] ≤ T + ∆, and each Pi will receive x at global time time
Clock ≤ T + δ.
Upon receiving (x, crU), each Pi checks the validity of crU, and computes (all com-
putation is done in time 2 · Tcomp) and broadcasts the value (i,m = (p, x, crU),
Sigski(m)) to all other IC peers by global time
Clock ≤ T + δ + 2Tcomp.
Therefore, according to the Posting protocol description, each peer Pi will
receive signatures from other honest peers by global time
Clock ≤ (T + δ + 2Tcomp) + δ = T + 2δ + 2Tcomp,
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as user U broadcast (x, crU) to all IC peers.
In order for an honest peer Pi to add (p, x) to Bi,p, it must receive and verify
the validity of Nc − tc − 1 signatures from the other peers, as the adversary can
also send at most tc invalid messages on behalf of malicious IC peers
1. The time
required for verification is at most (tc + (Nc − tc − 1)) · Tcomp = (Nc − 1) · Tcomp,
and the signature share will be created in time Tcomp. Therefore, each honest Pi
will send its TSS share at global time
Clock ≤ (T + 2δ + 2Tcomp) +NcTcomp = T + 2δ + (Nc + 2)Tcomp.
The user U will obtain TSS shares from all honest peers by global time
Clock ≤ (T + 2δ + (Nc + 2)Tcomp) + δ = T + 3δ + (Nc + 2)Tcomp.
The user U requires at most Nc ·Tcomp to verify all shares (again, A can send invalid
shares). Finally, the user U will require at most Tcomp time to combine the TSS
shares and obtain her receipt by global time
Clock ≤ (T + 3δ + (Nc + 2)Tcomp) + (Nc + 1)Tcomp = T + 3δ + (2Nc + 3)Tcomp,
and by internal time
Clock[U] ≤ T + ∆ + 3δ + (2Nc + 3)Tcomp.
Consequently, we set the upper bound θ∗ for the waiting time of U as
θ∗ := ∆ + 3δ + (2Nc + 3)Tcomp.
The validity of the receipt that U computes derives directly from the fact that
Nc − tc ≥ ts + 1 > tc and TSS is (ts, Nc)-EUF-CMA-secure with 1 − negl(κ)
probability.
If there is a moment T ′ s.t. for every T ′′ ≥ T ′, x is included in the view of WBB,
then (L.3.b) can not hold. To prove this statement, we first show that by the end
of period p, all honest peers agree on their local records, i.e., for every distinct
honest peers Pi,Pj, it holds that Bi,p = Bj,p. This happens because the following
two cases hold.
(i) All honest peers agree on the actions of the honest users: since condition
(L.2) of GA,δ,∆,tc,0θ−C.Live (1κ,E) and θ ≥ θ∗, every honest peer Pi contributes to the
generation of receipts of all honest users by providing its TSS share when receiving
an honest post (x, crU). Recall that an honest user will always engage in the Posting
1The malicious IC peers can send messages arbitrarily. However, for simplicity and without
loss of generality for the liveness guarantee, we treat the messages of each malicious peer as a
block. Thus, Pi can receive at most tc malicious messages.
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protocol consistently with posting policy P by never posting non-accepting items.
In addition, by the description in Section 5.1, TSS shares are provided only after
the honest peers add an honestly posted item in their local records. By the EUF-
CMA security of Σ, with 1−negl(κ) probability, when verification is complete Pi
is ascertained that Nc− tc− 1 honest peers have received and signed x. Therefore,
each honest peer Pi includes every honestly posted item x in Bi,p.
(ii) All honest peers agree on the actions of the malicious users: this case captures
of the following two sub-cases:
(a) A malicious user Uˆ posted an item xˆ such that at least honest peer Pi is
aware of xˆ: by the description in Section 5.1, Pi will broadcast xˆ upon receiving
it from Uˆ. Therefore, with some delay, all honest peers will receive xˆ and engage
in the process of agreement for receipt generation. The latter implies that each
honest peer Pj will either reject xˆ as Pi will do or accept xˆ as Pi will do, resulting
in the addition of xˆ in every honest local BB record.
(b) A malicious user Uˆ posted an item xˆ such that no honest IC peer is aware
of xˆ: For instance, Uˆ partially broadcast x only to the tc malicious peers. In this
case, clearly no honest IC peer will include xˆ in its local record. (Observe that if
malicious IC peer sends his signature on xˆ to at least one honest IC peer Pi, we
can argue similarly as in (a), i.e., if Pi accepts x, with some delay, all honest peers
will receive xˆ and engage in the process of agreement for receipt generation if Pi
accepts.)
Taking into account the message delay δ for re-broadcasting among the honest
IC peers, and the fact that each honest Pi stops broadcasting messages in the
Posting protocol at time Clock[Pi] = Tend,p + ∆ and stops receiving messages and
engages in the Publishing protocol at time
Clock[Pi] = Tend,p + ∆ + δ,
agreement on the local BB records is guaranteed. As a result, all Nc−tc ≥ ts+1 >
tc honest peers will provide the WBB with (i,m = (p,Bi,p), ShareSigsski(m)) by
global time at most
Clock ≤ (Tend,p + δ) + Tcomp = Tend,p + δ + Tcomp.
In the above we have that an IC peer creates a signature share in time Tcomp.
Then, the WBB will receive all Nc − tc shares and combine them to produce and
publish WBBreceipt[p,Bp] for period p by global time
Clock ≤ (Tend,p + δ + Tcomp) + δ + (Nc + 1)Tcomp
= Tend,p + 2δ + (Nc + 2)Tcomp.
In the above, we assume that all WBB computation is done in time (tc +Nc− tc) ·
Tcomp +Tcomp as WBB needs to wait for at least Nc− tc valid signature shares and
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combine a valid TSS. As the adversary can not create more than tc TSS shares for
records that do not include x, and the view of the honest WBB is append only,
we have that for global time
Clock := T ′ = Tend,p + ∆ + 2δ + (Nc + 2)Tcomp
and for any T ′′ ≥ T ′, x is included in the view of the WBB. This concludes the
proof.
It follows from Theorem 5.3 that the new fully secure BB system tolerates
< Nc/2 corrupted IC peers to achieve Confirmable Liveness.
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6 Related Work
In this section, we give an overview of other BB systems introduced in the litera-
ture. We consider the idea of using Byzantine Agreement protocols and describe
BB systems of Peters [Pet05], Heather and Lundin [HL09], Krummenacher [Kru10],
STAR-Vote [BBK+12, BBB+13], D-DEMOS [CZZ+16] and Dini [Din03].
We stress that from the above [HL09] focuses only on BB and has been pub-
lished, STAR-Vote, D-DEMOS and e-voting service proposed by Dini have been
indeed published in a conference/journal, but describe entire voting system and
do not focus on BB systems.
6.1 Byzantine Agreement Problem
The problem of achieving consensus in a distributed system in case of Byzan-
tine, i.e., arbitrary failures, is known as the Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem
[LSP82]. The idea is that all honest peers must agree on the output value and it
can be shown that these protocols tolerate strictly less that N/3 faulty peers.
The authors of [CGS97] claim that a BB system can be viewed as a secure
broadcast channel and it can be implemented as a set of replicated servers im-
plementing a BA protocol. Classical BA protocols can be used to agree on the
vote-set, but they are not suitable for implementing vote collection. Furthermore,
the majority of such protocols require synchronous communication model and have
unreasonable computation complexity for practical use in the voting scenario.
In general, Byzantine fault-tolerance is an important characteristic of a system
and a number of Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms using state machine repli-
cation have been introduced and implemented, e.g., [CL02] and [SB12]. These
algorithms tolerate < N/3 faulty replicas, but they are much more costly and
their actual cryptographic security is unknown, and must be thoroughly studied
before applying it to e-voting scenario.
6.2 Peters’ Bulletin Board
In his Master’s thesis Peters [Pet05] studies different protocols implementing a se-
cure broadcast channel. He compares communication and computation complex-
ity, threat models and chooses to implement a variation of a protocol proposed in
[Rei94] on top of a secure group membership protocol from [Rei96]. He states that
his goal is to give an implementation and he does not concentrate on studying the
cryptographic security and complete descriptions for the protocols.
The overall idea is somewhat similar to a two-phase commit protocol, i.e., a
user sends a message to a random IC peer. This particular peer first broadcasts a
so called init message and others reply with signed echo message. Once the peer
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receives signatures from more than 2Nc/3 peers, it broadcasts a commit message.
Again a peer waits for more than 2Nc/3 signed confirmations, constructs the receipt
and sends it to the user.
In order to improve the communication and computation complexity, Peters
replaces digital signatures with threshold signatures. Peters does not assume the
existence of any trusted third party and stresses that to get a completely dis-
tributed BB no trusted set-up must be required. The set-up phase is completely
distributed and, therefore, the threshold signature scheme tolerates only ts < N/2
and by definition tc + 1 signature shares are required to generate a valid threshold
signature. In his work, Peters considers [Bol03] to be a suitable signature scheme.
As the cryptographic security of the system is not studied, it might be an issue.
This can be solved using the trivial TSS. In his Master’s thesis [Beu12], Beuchat
implements a BB based on [Pet05], but uses a TSS of [Sho00] that also requires a
trusted third party for key generation.
In the BB system, the secure group membership protocol [Rei96] is used to
maintain the set of currently operational and correct peers.
Peters work includes a detailed description of the protocols and justifies the cor-
rectness in this setting, but without formal security analysis and verification this
system cannot be used in a real world setting. Furthermore, Peters assumes the
network is always reliable (not only for liveness), i.e., all honest peers can always
communicate with each other and an honest peer failing to communicate is con-
sidered to be corrupted and will lead to execution of the secure group membership
protocol.
Therefore, the threat model and lack of formal cryptographic proof makes this
system not suitable for use in real-world election process, at least before it has not
been analysed cryptographically.
6.3 Heather and Lundin’s Bulletin Board
Heather and Lundin [HL09] propose a BB system motivated by the requirements
of e-voting systems. Heather and Lundin identify the following security proper-
ties: Unalterable History which in an analogue of Unremovability (bb.4); Certified
Publishing which is an analogue of Stability (bb.1); Timely Publication which
is somewhat similar to Confirmable Liveness, meaning that a posted item must
eventually be published.
They propose a system containing only a single peer and prove that it satisfies
the aforementioned requirements. The system uses locking and hashing, thus,
it does not scale well. Heather and Lundin also point out the importance of a
distributed and fault-tolerant BB. They briefly discuss possible approaches, but
leave concrete system and its security analysis for future work.
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6.4 Krummenacher’s Bulletin Board
In MSE Seminar on E-Voting Krummenacher [Kru10] proposes a distributed BB
system for e-voting applications inspired by the system introduced in [HL09].
Krummenacher improves the approach of Heather and Lundin making it fault-
tolerant and distributed using threshold signatures. In his implementation, a BB
is public, i.e., everyone can read published items, once an item is published it
cannot be removed or deleted, and each reader must be able to detect insertion,
change and deletion.
Similarly the approach of Heather and Lundin, Krummenacher makes very
strong assumptions, e.g., he assumes that there exists an adequate public key
infrastructure. Krummenacher states that the system is distributed, but uses
RSA threshold signature [Sho00], which has a trusted dealer. (To overcome this
issue, the trivial threshold signature scheme can be used.)
There are both synchronous and asynchronous versions of the protocol. How-
ever, it is stated that the synchronous version is not suitable for e-voting appli-
cations, because it cannot tolerate large amount of write requests due to locking.
Thus, in the following, we concentrate on the asynchronous version.
Different variants of asynchronous protocols and their disadvantages are pre-
sented. In one version, the user publishes on several boards in parallel leading to
loss of performance by locking, but it is claimed that once a user receives a receipt
it is guaranteed that l out of Nc IC peers have published the message, where l is
the size of the threshold set, i.e., TSS is used to create the receipt.
In another variant of the asynchronous protocol, the user posts a message
independently to l out of Nc peers, in this case it is not guaranteed that all l peers
will also publish the message as threshold signing is not used. In both cases, IC
peers may have their own history of items posted and to get a full public WBB,
these histories must be combined.
Furthermore, Krummenacher describes a concrete implementation of BB, but
does not present a formal security proof. Krummenacher states that the system
is correct if more than Nc/2 of IC peers are up and running. We stress that (in
comparison to C-S or the fully secure BB system) the usage of locks leads to loss
of performance.
6.5 Bulletin Board of STAR-Vote
STAR-Vote ([BBK+12, BBB+13]) is an example of a kiosk-based voting system
which is designed to tolerate faulty peers. Although the functionality of the BB in
STAR-Vote is also to collect the votes and publish them in the end of an election
period, the setting is completely different from remote e-voting. In other words,
in STAR-Vote, voting terminals play the role of BB. As a result, the collection
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of votes is not addressed and only the problem of tracking the counted votes is
considered.
This is claimed to be solved by using the approach of [SDW08]. The idea
is that Voting terminals in polling stations maintain a log of votes using a hash
chain, i.e., votes are simply hashed into the chain and, therefore, the log can not
be altered. This cannot be applied in a remote e-voting setting when the system
must scale and handle multiple users posting items. Furthermore, there is no
formal protocol description nor security proof, and the threat model is very weak,
i.e., local network is considered to be reliable.
In conclusion, STAR-Vote includes a protocol for collecting votes and posting
them to a remote WBB, the voting terminals just maintain a log of cotes using a
hash chain. However, it does not address the problem of inconsistencies between
the voting terminals.
6.6 Bulletin Board of D-DEMOS
D-DEMOS is a distributed I-voting system introduced by Chrondros et al. in
[CZZ+16], which addresses the issues of DEMOS [KZZ15]. In DEMOS vote vol-
lection is done by a centralized Election Authority, but in D-DEMOS BB func-
tionality is divided into two distributed sub-systems, namely, the vote collection
sub-system (in our notation, IC sub-system) and the BB sub-system (in our nota-
tion, the WBB sub-system). The IC sub-system is responsible for vote collection
and runs two protocols: the Voting protocol and the Vote-Set Consensus protocol.
Both protocols are explicitly described and analysed. The protocol can tolerate
< Nc/3 corrupted IC peers and < Nc/2 corrupted WBB peers.
The idea is that a user sends a vote only to one IC peer which is responsible
for delivering the receipt back to the user. This IC peer communicates with other
IC peers to create a receipt and a uniqueness certificate for the ballot indicating
that this user has voted making use of verifiable threshold secret sharing and
digital signatures. In the end of election period, IC sub-system runs the Vote-Set
Consensus protocol to guarantee that all honest IC peers agree on the vote-set.
After the execution of the latter protocol, IC nodes publish their results to all
WBB peers. A WBB peers accepts a vote-set when it receives tc+ 1 identical sets.
The main difference with [CS14b] is that the vote collection is completely asyn-
chronous. Furthermore, the set of votes is uploaded to the distributed WBB in
the end of election period. We believe that it is due to the complexity of the Vote-
Set Consensus protocol, because for each vote ballot Bracha’s binary consensus
protocol [Bra87] is executed. We do not consider it computationally reasonable in
real-world elections to perform a binary consensus for each ballot. We are inter-
ested in an approach where votes can be published in some period p so that voters
get the opportunity to validate their votes. However, in D-DEMOS vote can be
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validated only in the end of the election period.
The security of D-DEMOS is studied in a cryptographic model. More precisely,
the authors of [CZZ+16] show that if a voter obtains a receipt, then with high
probability it is assured that the vote will be published on the honest WBB peer.
Furthermore, the liveness is achieved in asynchronous communication model. We
note that in our framework presented in Section 3, we make use of the notation
from [CZZ+16].
6.7 E-Voting Service of Dini
Dini [Din03] proposes a distributed e-voting service following the approach of
[FOO92]. It is based on replication and tolerates arbitrary failures. Dini does not
focus on the BB system, but on an e-voting service in general.
Dini requires the system to achieve Eligibility, Uniqueness, Privacy and Avail-
ability. The drawbacks of the approach are that a sender anonymous channel is
needed and that the voter will have to run a validation protocol. On the other
hand, in our approach, we formalize the requirements of voting where it is as-
sumed that the voter gets a credential that authenticates her during ballot casting
with the voting collection system, therefore, no anonymous channel requirements




In this thesis, we studied BB systems for e-voting from functionality and security
aspect. Based on the analysis of security requirements proposed by Culnane and
Schneider in Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2014, we introduced a
cryptographic framework for secure BB systems. We expanded the model of Garay
et al. from Eurocrypt 2015 for secure blockchain protocols, and considered a secure
BB as an RPTL that additionally supports the generation of receipts for successful
postings. We described two properties: Persistence and Confirmable Liveness. We
used confirmability in the Liveness property to capture the generation of receipts.
We also extended the Persistence property to be confirmable. In other words, the
dishonesty of WBB can be detected via verification of published data.
We analysed the security of C-S BB system. We showed that C-S BB does not
achieve Confirmable Persistence for < N/3 corrupted IC peers without using the
trivial threshold signature scheme. In case of using a TSS with distributed key
generation, the bound is < N/4. Furthermore, we attacked liveness of C-S BB
and showed that it does not achieve Confirmable Liveness in case of corrupted IC
peers.
Inspired by the security analysis of C-S BB, we presented a fully secure and
simple BB system that tolerates < N/3 corrupted IC peers for Confirmable Per-
sistence and < N/2 corrupted IC peers for Confirmable Liveness.
This thesis is based on a submitted paper ”A Cryptographic Approach to Bul-
letin Boards” with co-authors Aggelos Kiayas, Helger Lipmaa, Janno Siim and
Thomas Zacharias. We note that security proofs in this thesis are more detailed
compared to the submitted paper. Furthermore, in our paper we do not prove Con-
firmable Persistence for C-S BB, and do not present related work on BB systems
as thoroughly as in this thesis.
In future work, the concept of clashing items must be further studied. Namely,
in Estonian e-voting, it is required that as a countermeasure against corruption it
must be possible to re-vote. Currently all votes are published on the WBB which
can not be the case for that scenario. Furthermore, the proposed fully secure BB
system needs to be implemented and benchmarked.
41
References
[Abr10] Jean-Raymond Abrial. Modeling in Event-B: System and Software En-
gineering. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 1st edi-
tion, 2010.
[AL10] Yonatan Aumann and Yehuda Lindell. Security Against Covert Ad-
versaries: Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries. J. Cryptology,
23(2):281–343, 2010.
[AMN01] Michel Abdalla, Sara K. Miner, and Chanathip Namprempre. Forward-
Secure Threshold Signature Schemes. In David Naccache, editor, CT-
RSA 2001, volume 2020 of LNCS, pages 441–456, San Francisco, CA,
USA, April 8–12, 2001. Springer, Heidelberg.
[BBB+13] Susan Bell, Josh Benaloh, Michael D. Byrne, Dana Debeauvoir, Bryce
Eakin, Philip Kortum, Neal McBurnett, Olivier Pereira, Philip B.
Stark, Dan S. Wallach, Gail Fisher, Julian Montoya, Michelle Parker,
and Michael Winn. STAR-Vote: A Secure, Transparent, Auditable, and
Reliable Voting System. In 2013 Electronic Voting Technology Work-
shop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE 13), Washing-
ton, D.C., 2013. USENIX Association.
[BBK+12] Josh Benaloh, Mike Byrne, Philip T. Kortum, Neal McBurnett, Olivier
Pereira, Philip B. Stark, and Dan S. Wallach. STAR-Vote: A Se-
cure, Transparent, Auditable, and Reliable Voting System. CoRR,
abs/1211.1904, 2012.
[BCS16] Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, and Steve Schneider. vVote: Verifiable
Electronic Voting in Practice. IEEE Security and Privacy, 14(4):64–73,
2016.
[Beu12] Jose Beuchat. Realization of a Secure Distributed Bulletin Board, Mas-
ter’s Thesis. Bern University of Applied Sciences, 2012.
[Bol03] Alexandra Boldyreva. Threshold Signatures, Multisignatures and Blind
Signatures Based on the Gap-Diffie-Hellman-Group Signature Scheme.
In Yvo Desmedt, editor, PKC 2003, volume 2567 of LNCS, pages 31–46,
Miami, Florida, USA, January 6–8, 2003. Springer, Heidelberg.
[Bra87] Gabriel Bracha. Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement Protocols. Inf.
Comput., 75(2):130–143, November 1987.
42
[CGS97] Ronald Cramer, Rosario Gennaro, and Berry Schoenmakers. A Secure
and Optimally Efficient Multi-Authority Election Scheme, pages 103–
118. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1997.
[Cha81] David Chaum. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and
Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84–88, 1981.
[Cha01] David Chaum. Surevote: International patent WO 01/55940 A1, 2001.
[CL02] Miguel Castro and Barbara Liskov. Practical Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance and Proactive Recovery. ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 20(4):398–
461, November 2002.
[CRST15] Chris Culnane, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve A. Schneider, and Vanessa
Teague. vVote: A Verifiable Voting System. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst.
Secur., 18(1):3:1–3:30, 2015.
[CS14a] Chris Culnane and Steve Schneider. A Peered Bulletin Board for Ro-
bust Use in Verifiable Voting Systems. CoRR, abs/1401.4151, 2014.
[CS14b] Chris Culnane and Steve A. Schneider. A Peered Bulletin Board for
Robust Use in Verifiable Voting Systems. In CSF 2014, pages 169–183,
Vienna, Austria, July 19–22, 2014. IEEE Computer Society.
[CZZ+16] Nikos Chondros, Bingsheng Zhang, Thomas Zacharias, Panos Diaman-
topoulos, Stathis Maneas, Christos Patsonakis, Alex Delis, Aggelos Ki-
ayias, and Mema Roussopoulos. D-DEMOS: A Distributed, End-to-
End Verifiable, Internet Voting System. In ICDCS 2016, pages 711–720,
Nara, Japan, June 27–30, 2016. IEEE Computer Society.
[Dam88] Ivan Bjerre Damg˚ard. Collision Free Hash Functions and Public Key
Signature Schemes, pages 203–216. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 1988.
[Des88] Yvo Desmedt. Society and Group Oriented Cryptography: A New Con-
cept. In A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques on Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO ’87, pages 120–127,
London, UK, UK, 1988. Springer-Verlag.
[Din03] Gianluca Dini. A Secure and Available Electronic Voting Service for a
Large-Scale Distributed system. Future Generation Computer Systems,
19(1):69–85, 2003.
43
[FL16] Prastudy Fauzi and Helger Lipmaa. Efficient Culpably Sound NIZK
Shuffle Argument without Random Oracles. In Kazue Sako, editor,
CT-RSA 2016, volume 9610 of LNCS, pages 200–216, San Franscisco,
CA, USA, February 29–March 4, 2016. Springer, Heildeberg.
[FLZ16] Prastudy Fauzi, Helger Lipmaa, and Micha l Zajac. A Shuffle Argument
Secure in the Generic Model. In Jung Hee Cheon and Tsuyoshi Takagi,
editors, ASIACRYPT 2016 (2), volume 10032 of LNCS, pages 841–872,
Hanoi, Vietnam, December 4–8, 2016. Springer, Heidelberg.
[FOO92] Atsushi Fujioka, Tatsuaki Okamoto, and Kazuo Ohta. A Practical
Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections. In AUSCRYPT, pages
244–251, 1992.
[Fur05] Jun Furukawa. Efficient and Verifiable Shuffling and Shuffle-
Decryption. IEICE Transactions, 88-A(1):172–188, 2005.
[GKL15] Juan A. Garay, Aggelos Kiayias, and Nikos Leonardos. The Bitcoin
Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications. In EUROCRYPT,
pages 281–310, 2015.
[GMR88] Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Ronald L. Rivest. A Digital Signa-
ture Scheme Secure Against Adaptive Chosen-Message Attacks. SIAM
J. Comput., 17:281–308, 1988.
[HL09] James Heather and David Lundin. The Append-Only Web Bulletin
Board. In Pierpaolo Degano, Joshua Guttman, and Fabio Martinelli,
editors, Formal Aspects in Security and Trust: 5th International Work-
shop, FAST 2008 Malaga, Spain, October 9-10, 2008 Revised Selected
Papers, pages 242–256, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. Springer Berlin Hei-
delberg.
[HT94] Vassos Hadzilacos and Sam Toueg. A Modular Approach to Fault-
Tolerant Broadcasts and Related Problems. Technical report, 1994.
[HW14] Sven Heiberg and Jan Willemson. Verifiable Internet Voting in Estonia.
In EVOTE 2014, pages 1–8, Oct 2014.
[Kru10] Roland Krummenacher. Implementation of a Web Wulletin Board for
E-Voting Applications. MSE Seminar on E-Voting. Institute for Inter-
net Technologies and Applications, 2010.
[KZZ15] Aggelos Kiayias, Thomas Zacharias, and Bingsheng Zhang. End-to-End
Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model, pages 468–498. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2015.
44
[Lam77] Leslie Lamport. Proving the Correctness of Multiprocess Programs.
IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng., 3(2):125–143, March 1977.
[LJY14] Benoˆıt Libert, Marc Joye, and Moti Yung. Born and Raised Distribu-
tively: Fully Distributed Non-Interactive Adaptively-Secure Threshold
Signatures with Short Shares. In PODC 2014, pages 303–312, Paris,
France, July 15–18, 2014. ACM Press.
[LSP82] Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. The Byzantine
Generals Problem, volume 4, pages 382–401. ACM, New York, NY,
USA, July 1982.
[LZ12] Helger Lipmaa and Bingsheng Zhang. A More Efficient Computation-
ally Sound Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Shuffle Argument. In Ivan
Visconti and Roberto De Prisco, editors, SCN 2012, volume 7485 of
LNCS, pages 477–502, Amalfi, Italy, September 5–7, 2012. Springer,
Heidelberg.
[Nak08] Satoshi Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System,
http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, 2008.
[Nef01] C. Andrew Neff. A Verifiable Secret Shuffle and Its Application to E-
Voting. In ACM CCS 2001, pages 116–125, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
USA, November 6–8 2001. ACM Press.
[Pet05] R. A. Peters. A Secure Bulletin Board, Master’s Thesis. Eindhoven
University of Technology, 2005.
[Rei94] Michael K. Reiter. Secure Agreement Protocols: Reliable and Atomic
Group Multicast in Rampart. In Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’94, pages
68–80, New York, NY, USA, 1994. ACM.
[Rei96] Michael K. Reiter. A Secure Group Membership Protocol. IEEE Trans.
Softw. Eng., 22(1):31–42, January 1996.
[SB12] Joa˜o Sousa and Alysson Neves Bessani. From Byzantine Consensus
to BFT State Machine Replication: A Latency-Optimal Transforma-
tion. In Cristian Constantinescu and Miguel P. Correia, editors, EDCC,
pages 37–48. IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
[SDW08] Daniel Sandler, Kyle Derr, and Dan S. Wallach. VoteBox: A Tamper-
Evident, Verifiable Electronic Voting System. In Paul C. van Oorschot,
editor, USENIX Security Symposium, pages 349–364. USENIX Associ-
ation, 2008.
45
[Sha79] Adi Shamir. How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM,
22(11):612–613, 1979.
[Sho00] Victor Shoup. Practical Threshold Signatures. In Bart Preneel, editor,
EUROCRYPT 2000, volume 1807 of LNCS, pages 207–220, Bruges,
Belgium, May 14–18, 2000. Springer, Heidelberg.
[TW10] Bjo¨rn Terelius and Douglas Wikstro¨m. Proofs of Restricted Shuffles.
In Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange, editors, AFRICACRYPT
2010, volume 6055 of LNCS, pages 100–113, Stellenbosch, South Africa,
May 3–6, 2010. Springer, Heidelberg.
46
Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public
I, Annabell Kuldmaa (date of birth: 17th of July 1993),
1. herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to:
1.1 reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making available to the public,
including for addition to the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of
validity of the copyright, and
1.2 make available to the public via the web environment of the University of
Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until expiry of the term of
validity of the copyright,
On Secure Bulletin Boards for E-Voting
supervised by Helger Lipmaa
2. I am aware of the fact that the author retains these rights.
3. I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe the intellectual
property rights or rights arising from the Personal Data Protection Act.
Tartu, 18.05.2017
47
